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Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath
Susanna Siegel
Wishful thinking, fearful thinking, and prejudice can generate ill-founded beliefs. 
These beliefs are ill-founded by virtue of the way that other mental states 
influence their formation. Once formed, they pass on their ill-foundedness to 
subsequent beliefs formed on their basis. I argue that the same is true of 
experiences. Wishful seeing, fearful seeing, and prejudiced seeing can generate 
epistemically downgraded experiences. Downgraded experiences are formed in 
ways that reduce or eliminate the rational support they have to offer. Beliefs 
formed on their basis are thereby ill-founded.
Huemer and Fumerton disagree. They think experiences aren’t downgradable by 
their etiology. Wishfully seeing a gun in the fridge can provide evidence that 
there’s a gun in the fridge. Wishful seeing can’t downgrade experiences, even 
though wishful thinking can lead to ill-founded belief. In this respect, experiences 
and beliefs are asymmetrical. McGrath agrees with me, and thinks that standard 
evidentialists should too. He thinks that wishfully seeing a gun in the fridge 
disqualifies the gun-experience from providing evidence that there’s a gun in the 
fridge. He proposes that epistemically downgraded experiences all share a 
common structure. The structure is designed to highlight the symmetry in rational
status that we find (and Huemer and Fumerton don’t find) between evidentially ill-
founded beliefs and epistemically downgraded experiences. And it brings into 
focus McGrath’s reasons for thinking that evidentialists should agree that 
experiences would be epistemically downgraded by the cases of cognitive 
penetration that I describe.
After responding to McGrath’s evidentialist proposal in section 1, and to 
Huemer’s argument against the epistemic symmetries in section 2, I defend the 
epistemic symmetries in section 3. I conclude by discussing the rational force of 
experiences that aren’t defeated or downgraded.
1. The structure of epistemic downgrades
The centerpiece in McGrath’s structure is the notion of quasi-inference, which is 
a relation between experiences. Perhaps these are better called 
“subexperiences” since they often occur simultaneously. Experiences formed by 
quasi-inferences are downgraded, if the corresponding beliefs formed by 
isomorphic inferences would result in jumping to conclusions. 
Even if quasi-inferences between experiences mirror poor inferences to beliefs, 
some reason is needed to think that epistemically poor quasi-inferences do to 
experiences what poor inferences do to beliefs: namely, turn them into conduits 
of ill-foundedness. McGrath takes for granted that experiences and beliefs are 
rationally symmetrical in this way. His account of quasi-inference thus could not 
provide an independent defense of the Downgrade Principle. 
McGrath nonetheless presents the account of quasi-inference as a defense of 
the Downgrade principle, perhaps with the idea that if evidentialists appreciated 
just how much the “checkering” process is like a poor inference, they would 
agree that those experiences fail to provide evidence for believing their contents 
(or contents that are suitably related). His account thus challenges one putative 
explanation of the asymmetry thesis, namely that the etiology of belief can be 
inferential, whereas the etiology of experience cannot be. But it doesn’t have any 
edge against the stronger asymmetry thesis that, even when the etiology of an 
experience is quasi-inferential, it still does not lead to epistemic downgrade. 
McGrath’s notion of quasi-inference helps illustrate why, once the Downgrade 
Principle is accepted, it is compatible with standard evidentialism. On this 
approach, downgraded experience will not count as evidence (or will not count as
very good evidence). They will have that downgraded status, because they came
about via a process that is isomorphic to jumping to conclusions. The jump is 
from information about “low-level” properties, such as color, shape, size, and 
texture, to representations of high-level properties, such as emotions (anger) or 
kinds (pliers, embryos).
Jill’s experience of Jack as angry seems to be based on an experience of 
his looking a certain way which in fact isn’t a good indicator of anger for 
her.  There is a gap here that is filled in, or leapt across, only by the 
expectation that Jack is angry, not by Jill’s knowledge connecting the 
lower-level content with the higher-level one.  The preformationist sees 
something of a certain shape, size and texture which in fact isn’t a good 
indicator of an embryo, but which serves as his basis for seeing it as am 
embryo.  Here again there is a gap between the shape, size and texture 
features and the embryo feature, and it is only the desire to see one’s 
theory confirmed which “closes” the gap.  The pliers have a certain color, 
shape, and size – a certain gestalt – that not much of a good indicator of a
gun, but nonetheless the subjects, on this basis, with the help of the 
prejudice rather than any background knowledge or perceptual ability, the 
subject sees the object as a gun.  
Ultimately, I think the pliers, gun, and anger cases don’t have to take the form of 
a quasi-inference (i.e., an inference from “low” to “high”), and that quasi-inference
does not play a central role in illustrating the compatibility between evidentialism 
and the Downgrade Principle. Let me first explain why someone (perhaps 
McGrath) might think that quasi-inference is essential to epistemic downgrades, 
and thus plays a central role in illuminating their structure.
Quasi-inference is analogous in some ways to the resolution of the 
underdetermination problem in perception. Sensory transducers take in the 
earliest sensory information, and that information is compatible with a wide range
of external conditions. Yet the visual system ends up with a much more 
determinate representation of the environment than the transducers convey. How
does the visual system arrive at a “verdict” on how the environment is, given the 
paucity of initial information? This is the under-determination problem. Quasi-
inference is structurally similar. As McGrath thinks of it, the fact that an 
experience represents certain low-level properties leaves undetermined which 
high-level properties it represents (if any). 
The under-determination problem is resolved in every case of perception. In light 
of this fact, one might be tempted to think that structurally similar quasi-
inferences also happen in every experience, and hence that epistemic 
downgrades are just a special subset of them. 
But the analogy between quasi-inference and the resolution of the under-
determination problem is overdrawn. First, since our only experience of low-level 
properties includes constancies of color, shape, and size, by the time we have 
such experiences, the under-determination has already been at least partly 
resolved. Second, unlike resolutions to the under-determination problem, quasi-
inferences are not psychologically real transitions from a low-level experience 
(i.e., an experience with low-level content) at one moment to a high-level 
experience at the next moment. In his more extended discussion of quasi-
inferences, McGrath emphasizes that they are dependence relations.1 If high-
level E* is quasi-inferred from low-level E, then the fact that the subject has the 
low-level E is supposed to help explain why she has the high-level E*. Typically 
the experiences related by quasi-inference happen simultaneously. When you 
see a bicycle, or your sister, these items do not usually need time to come into 
focus as a bicycle, or as a person.  
In addition, some routes to downgraded experiences avoid faulty quasi-
inferences altogether. In principle, a background cognitive state could directly 
influence an experience (more exactly, a subexperience), from which another 
subexperience is quasi-inferred without any epistemic shortcoming. Suppose that
prejudice made the pliers look to have the texture of a gun, or that fear made 
Jack’s eyebrows appear furrowed in the way that provides a cue for anger. In 
those cases, there might be a quasi-inference from low-level to high-level 
contents, but it would be mediated by “background knowledge or perceptual 
ability”. The epistemic fault would have to be found upstream, in the relationship 
between the background cognitive state and the experience at the start of the 
quasi-inference.
In other cases of cognitive penetration that are intuitively epistemically 
problematic, having a high-level experience could help explain why the subject 
has a low-level experience, where this dependence relation is again epistemically
innocuous. For example, acrophobes standing on high balconies tend to 
overestimate their distance from the ground, compared with people standing on 
the same balcony who are not afraid of heights.2 The acrophobe’s fear might lead
1 McGrath (forthcoming).
2 Stefanucci and Proffitt (2009).
her to experience a balcony as being at a distance that is dangerous to fall from, 
and that (sub)experience might explain why she experiences the distance to the 
ground as magnitude D+. The corresponding inference is roughly that if a 
balcony is a dangerous height to fall from, it is pretty far off the ground - at least 
D+. That inference seems reasonable. By the belief measure for downgrade, the 
inference is epistemically innocuous. If there is an epistemic problem, it is in the 
role of fear in influencing the danger-experience.
The notion of quasi-inference could be reconceived to allow desires, fears, or 
other states as well as experiences to be states from which experiences are 
quasi-inferred. This would free the notion of quasi-inference from the model of 
the underdetermination problem, and the resulting notion could account for these
cases, as well as for downgrades that are located where McGrath finds them, in 
the poor low-to-high quasi-inference. I think McGrath resists this suggestion 
because he worries it will overgenerate, by classifying as irrational processes in 
which a desire to believe that the lights are on leads one to turn on the lights, 
thereby generating what should be perfectly good evidence that the lights are on.
In this case (suggested originally by Feldman 2000), a desire influences the 
contents of experience, but not in any way that should downgrade that 
experience. For downgrade to occur, McGrath says, “The influence of the 
directional goal must, at the very least, occur internally, i.e., after the initial 
stimulation of sensory receptors” - which is what leads him to his notion of quasi-
inference. 
But it is not necessary to move to the overly restrictive notion of quasi-inference 
to exclude Feldman’s sort of case from the category of checkered experiences, 
because it can be ruled out by my isomorphism requirement on such 
experiences.  When we compare etiologies of experience and belief, it isn’t 
enough for the psychological elements to be isomorphic. The psychological 
mechanisms have to be isomorphic as well. In Feldman’s case, the mechanism 
by which desire influences belief crucially includes the intentional act of turning 
on the lights. The isomorphic etiology of experience would include the same act: 
desire to experience a well-lit room could influence the contents of experience by
leading you to turn on the lights. In contrast to these epistemically innocuous 
forms of influence by desire on belief and experience, a different form of 
influence leaves out the manipulation of perceptual stimuli, and the desire 
influences the belief or experience directly. This would be a case of wishful 
thinking for belief and wishful seeing (or hallucinating) for experience. Non-
hallucinatory cases will involve external perceptual stimuli as well. But the root of 
the epistemic problem lies in the influence by the desire on the experience of 
light.
2. What is one supposed to believe in response to a checkered experience?
Huemer objects to the idea that experiences are susceptible to downgrade in the 
ways McGrath and I describe. He observes that when one’s experience is 
undefeated, it will seem rational to endorse it, and irrational to suspend judgment 
or disbelieve one’s eyes. Given that the subject has an undefeated gun-
experience, what other doxastic response to it could possibly be rational, other 
than endorsing it?
This objection to the Downgrade Principle is the “What am I supposed to think?” 
objection, labeled aptly by McGrath. The objection assumes that any rational 
doxastic response to an experience has to present itself as such to the thinker. 
Huemer’s version of this assumption appears in Premise 6 of his argument (E is 
the proposition that an egg carton is in the fridge, G is the proposition that a gun 
is in the fridge):
(6) If S would have no rational way of explaining why she believed E while 
refusing to accept G, then S would be irrational to believe E while 
refusing to accept G. 
Premise (6) assumes that a doxastic response is rational for S, only if S has a 
rational way to explain why she adopts it. This assumption is at odds with a direct
consequence of the Downgrade Principle. If S’s experience is downgraded 
relative to G, and so doesn’t provide rational support for G, then what S 
epistemically ought to do is suspend judgment on G, even if she has no rational 
way of explaining why that option is rational. (Here I am assuming S never had 
such strong prior reason to doubt that there’s a gun in the fridge that it would 
have defeated her experience to begin with).   
The assumption that a subject has to be able to explain why her doxastic 
responses are rational seems doubtful. Consider wishful remembering – the 
analog for memory of wishful thinking and wishful seeing.3 In McGrath’s talented 
children example, what a subject explicitly remembers seems rational to her, but 
is intuitively made irrational by virtue of her unretrieved memory of the other 
talented children in the piano class. Even though this memory is unretrieved, it 
intuitively provides a defeater for the belief that the thinker’s child is the most 
talented student in the class. 
Another type of example involves the inferential blindness that can accompany 
some types of compartmentalized beliefs. Suppose you believe you have an 
hour-long appointment with X alone at noon, and you also believe you have an 
hour-long appointment with Y alone at noon, but you fail to realize that you have 
conflicting appointments until X and Y both appear at your door.4 Intuitively, your 
belief that you will spend the midday hour with X (your X-belief) retains its 
rational force relative to your belief that you will spend the midday hour with Y 
(your Y-belief), and vice-versa. In light of your X-belief, your Y-belief is irrational. 
3 Kunda (1990).
4 This type of case is discussed in Silins and Siegel (forthcoming), and Siegel 
(forthcoming).
Yet at the moments when you remembered your appointment with X, it seemed 
rational to maintain your X-belief.  
Internalists are divided on how wide a range of mental factors belong to the base 
on which facts about justification supervene. Some forms of internalism allow that
person-level psychological configurations that are beyond what the subject has 
easy access to can affect the rational status of her beliefs. The Downgrade 
Principle fits naturally with such a version of mentalist internalism. Of course this 
type of mentalist internalism could also reject the Downgrade Principle, on the 
grounds that mental factors other than checkered experiences can affect what 
the subject has justification to believe, even when the subject fails to have easy 
access to them.5 
Huemer’s Premise (6) entails that the principle is false, and Huemer provides no 
independent support for it. On the other side, McGrath’s account of quasi-
inference does not provide independent support for the Downgrade Principle, 
since it entails that the principle is true. And so we come to the central issue: do 
the same etiological factors that lead to ill-founded beliefs downgrade 
experiences as well?  
3. Why experiences can be downgraded by their etiology
In defending the Downgrade Principle, my argumentative strategy is to focus on 
the features of beliefs that distinguish them from experiences, and argue that 
none of these features of beliefs ground their status as potential conduits for ill-
foundedness. Since beliefs must have some underlying features that explain 
what makes them this kind of conduit, if we don’t find this explanation among the 
distinctive features of beliefs, then they must be found among their non-
distinctive features. And if they are found among non-distinctive features, that 
opens the possibility that experiences have those features as well. 
McGrath and Fumerton say that I overlook an obvious candidate for a distinctive 
feature of belief that explains what makes them conduits of ill-foundedness: the 
fact that beliefs can be irrational (or unjustified), whereas experiences cannot. 
McGrath asks, “how can we hold fixed the irrational etiology while manipulating 
the belief’s status as unjustified to see if it still makes beliefs based on it 
unjustified?  We can’t.” I agree that in a case where the entire basis of an ill-
founded belief B2 is another belief B1, B1 has to be ill-founded, and therefore 
unjustified (irrational). But that fact doesn’t show that the status of B1 as irrational
is explaining what makes B2 ill-founded.  
5 Besides checkered experiences, highly inattentive experiences might also 
impact the rational status of beliefs that fail to take into account (an issue 
discussed in Silins and Siegel (forthcoming)), or experiences of situations that 
are bypassed in the formation of beliefs about those situations (Siegel 
forthcoming).
What does explain why beliefs are susceptible to ill-foundedness, and 
experiences are susceptible to downgrade, if not any susceptibility to being 
irrational?     
My answer is that the psychological role of experiences and beliefs is so similar 
that it grounds their role as conduits in the same way. It is uncontroversial that 
experience typically leads to belief. We tend to believe our eyes, and when we 
do, the cognitive roles of experience are a subset of the cognitive roles of beliefs.
Like beliefs, experiences provide input to the reasoning (including action plans) 
that we actually go through – whether that reasoning conforms to epistemic and 
practical norms or not. It is a psychological fact about us that when we 
experience a gun in the fridge – really experience one, as Huemer tries to depict 
with his photograph - we are generally disposed to act as if there is a gun in the 
fridge, and to take it for granted that there is a gun in the fridge in our other plans.
We could sum up this shared psychological role by saying that both experiences 
and beliefs are endorsements of contents. 
Of course sometimes, epistemic rationality dictates that we quarantine 
experiential endorsement, so that it does not interact in the usual ways with our 
other beliefs and with our behavior. For instance, if we know or have reason to 
think that there can’t be a gun in the fridge, then rationality dictates that we 
ignore how things seem.6 Often in these situations, the norms of epistemic 
rationality are difficult to adhere to. Even if you know that a mirage is making it 
look as if water is ahead, or even if you have excellent reason to think so, it may 
nonetheless be difficult for you not to act as if it is water is ahead. Some partly-
cured schizophrenics report that they were better able to ignore the voices in 
their head, after taking medication that reduced the auditory volume of those 
voices.7 When the voices were loud and clear, they were hard to ignore; when 
they were still heard but heard more softly, it was easier to respond to them as 
symptoms of a disease, rather than as part of reality. The cognitive role of these 
experiences play is largely the same as the role of beliefs.
Fumerton may have something like these psychological symmetries in mind, 
when he suggests that if experiences had contents (which he doubts, but grants 
for the sake of argument), then that feature alone would make them susceptible 
to downgrade, by making them assessable for rationality as well. “Once one does
[think of experiences as intentional states], it is no longer so obvious that one 
couldn’t think of them as rational or irrational (the way one sometimes thinks of 
6 Similarly, practical rationality might recommend that we quarantine our beliefs 
similar ways, for instance when it seems best to go along with a group plan to 
head to the movies even if you think the movie theater got torn down.
7 I first heard this reported by a patient who was being interviewed by his 
psychiatrist Donald Goff at a Harvard Mind, Brain, and Behavior Symposium, in 
the Fall of 2007, who told the symposium that such reports are common. See 
also Siris and Acosta 2012. The general phenomenon in which vivid experiences 
are difficult to ignore is described and predicted by Maher 1999.
fears, for example, as rational or irrational).” I think this suggestion can’t be quite 
right as it stands, because a state can have accuracy conditions, even if it does 
not play the role of an endorsement. Consider suppositions, such as those we 
make for the sake of argument, or for the sake of having a stable assumption to 
operate under when uncertainty is not practically viable. Suppositions can be 
accurate or inaccurate, and it may be wise or unwise to make them. But this kind 
of wisdom (or lack thereof) seems to be practical, rather than indicating epistemic
rationality or irrationality. Suppositions do not contribute to the subject’s overall 
point of view on the world in the way that experiences and beliefs do. Beliefs or 
even fears and desires might be conditionally rational, given a supposition, but 
the supposition itself does not seem assessable for rationality. What matters for 
being conduits of rationality isn’t having accuracy conditions, but having the 
psychological role that is common to experience and belief – the endorsement 
role.
Could experiences play the endorsement role, if they didn’t have accuracy 
conditions? They could, but the occupant of that role would have to be the 
experience supplemented with beliefs that “interpret” it. Consider Fumerton’s 
suggestion that the subjective character of experience is exhausted by 
sensations that are not assessable for accuracy. In Fumerton’s words, they 
would lack the capacity to “correspond or fail to correspond to reality.” This 
conception would fit with a traditional indirect realist theory, on which when you 
see pomegranates, they typically cause in you qualia (raw feels) that you come 
to learn are correlated with pomegranates.8 Here, the belief-like outputs would be
performed by qualia paired with an “interpretive” belief. This pair would feed into 
behavior and reasoning. The occupant of this belief-like role would be the 
experience supplemented with beliefs that “interpret” it. 
Qualia paired with ‘interpretive’ beliefs could also be susceptible to cognitive 
penetration, in the same ways as experiences are on the assumption that they 
have accuracy conditions of their own. In principle, either the qualia themselves, 
or the accompanying interpretive beliefs, or both could be influenced by desires 
or fears. For instance, in this framework, Jill’s fearful seeing could take the form 
of believing that her qualia (which in fact are normally caused by neutral 
expressions) are on this occasion caused by Jack’s anger. Or it could take the 
form of having qualia that are normally caused by angry expressions, but are on 
this occasion caused by Jack’s neutral expression. So while having accuracy 
conditions makes experiences autonomous modes of endorsing contents, 
experiences without accuracy conditions could form part of a complex unit that 
plays a similar psychological role.
8 Qualia are supposed to be aspects of experience that characterize our 
experience, independently of how the external world seems to us. But exactly 
analogous points hold for experiences construed as relations to sense-data, 
where these are mental objects that we perceive, and thereby perceive the 
external objects that cause them. 
Conclusion 
I’ve argued that the Downgrade Principle is true, and that it is compatible with 
various forms of internalism about justification. (That it is compatible with 
reliabilism seems obvious). But if the Downgrade Principle is true, a major 
question remains. When an experience is not downgraded or defeated, what 
gives that experience (or the experiences plus other factors) the power to provide
rational support for believing its contents?
Some phenomenal conservatives suggest that phenomenal character itself is a 
source of rational power, bestowing experiences with rational support for 
believing their contents (or closely related contents), absent defeaters.9 A less 
liberal suggestion it that rational powers are conferred on experiences by their 
phenomenal character, together with background beliefs (or “entitlements”) that 
we could not fail to have. A third suggestion is that endorsing states in general 
have rational powers, just by virtue of playing the endorsing role. Since beliefs 
are endorsing states, this position would be a thorough-going form of 
conservatism, encompassing both experiences and beliefs.
None of these explanations is available, if the Downgrade Principle is true. The 
Downgrade Principle allows that experiences could have their phenomenal 
character, play the endorsing role, lack defeaters of the relevant sort, and be 
accompanied by general background beliefs – all while failing to provide rational 
support for believing their contents. Like many other theories of perceptual 
justification, phenomenal conservatism and its less liberal cousin could be 
adjusted to accommodate the Downgrade Principle, by restricting the class of 
experiences on which rational support is bestowed by phenomenal character (or 
by phenomenal character plus general supplementary beliefs). 
A different proposal is that when the etiology of an experience is a-rational, rather
than rationally assessable, it bestows rational powers on the experience. This 
proposal is compatible with the Downgrade Principle, but is arguably false on 
independent grounds. Consider someone who undergoes the following perverse 
train of thought, fueled by an underlying association of Black men and crime.10 
While watching a film about Black nationalism, he suddenly wonders whether he 
remembered to lock the car. After the film, he is about to get in his car to drive 
home, when the same underlying association causes him to see the car door 
(which is in fact shut tight) as jutting out farther than normal from the car body, as
if the door were not shut properly. The etiology of this experience is more like an 
a-rational association between thoughts than a poor inference. Yet arguably, the 
misaligned-door experience is downgraded by the influence of the association.
9 Pryor 2001. On rational support that experiences provide for contents that are 
distinct but closely related to their own, see Silins 2011.
10 Eberhardt 2004 provides experimental evidence that something this 
association is widespread.
A last proposal is that the rational powers of undefeated, non-downgraded 
experiences is a leftover from the fact that in an intuitive sense, experiences 
typically enjoy a kind of rational priority when it conflicts with prior beliefs. 
Sometimes beliefs rationally defeat experiences – such as when you know that 
the watery appearance in the desert is a mirage. More often, when an experience
and prior belief conflict, it is rational to update your belief by privileging your 
experience. You thought there was no mustard in the fridge, but then saw some 
mustard there once you looked inside, and that changed your mind. In general, 
when beliefs and experiences have the same subject-matter, we treat the 
experiences as ultimate arbiters of the beliefs. It’s plausible to think that in 
general, perception has to give us a kind of access to that subject-matter that can
rationally override opposing beliefs (or disprove opposing hypotheses), or else it 
would not match our concept of perception. If we learned that downgraded or 
defeated experiences were the norm, rather than being phenomena that occur 
only around the edges, our concept of perception would need adjustment – as 
would our reliance on perception in testing empirical hypotheses. 
At a general level, the rational priority of experience over belief seems to derive 
from having access to the environment that is not obscured by what we 
antecedently believe, feel, want, or happen to be thinking about. Yet the priority 
does not explain why individual experiences have rational power, by identifying 
instances of that type of access. Veridicality is the simplest form of access, yet it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for conferring rational powers. It seems more 
illuminating to say that an experience provides rational support for its content, 
when it is close enough to a paradigm of perception, leaving the status of 
perception in general as providing such a support as an explanatory primitive.*   
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